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In 4 studies, the authors examined whether making outcome expectancies distinct resulted in their use as
comparison standards and, consequently, in contrastive dispositional inferences for a target's behaviors.
The expectancies examined were based on either chronic future-event expectancies (Study 1) or
temporary, manipulated expectancy standards (Studies 2-4). Analyses revealed that when contextual
expectancies were distinct or separable from target information, participants' dispositional judgments
were contrasted from them under cognitive load and overcorrected (assimilated to them) under no load.
These effects were mediated by participants' behavior categorizations. Evidence suggestive of a proce-
duralized form of correction for task difficulty and an effortful awareness-based correction for the effects
of expectancies also were found. Results are examined in light of recent models of the dispositional
inference process.
Over the past 40 years, social psychologists have learned a great
deal about how ordinary perceivers give meaning to the observed
actions of another person. Early treatments focused on the contents
of perceivers' intuitive theories of action. Heider (1958), for ex-
ample, proposed that perceivers believe successful enactment of
purposive behavior by another is dependent, in large part, on the
person's ability and the difficulty of environmental factors. Put
more formally, he argued that if a person succeeds at some task,
then perceivers' naive theories of action hold that that person's
ability must be greater than the environmental difficulty. If the
person fails (and if he or she was trying to perform the task), then
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his or her ability must be less than the environmental difficulty.
Accordingly, when attempting to understand the performance out-
comes of others, perceivers search for and use information about
the other's relevant dispositions as well as information about
potentially facilitative and inhibitory environmental factors.
To Heider's (1958) depiction of the contents of perceivers'
intuitive theories of action, more recent treatments have added the
notion that the default inferential goal often but not always is a
dispositional one (cf. Krull, 1993). Theorists also have suggested
that the dispositional inference process consists of stages that
differ in terms of their resource requirements. For example, Gil-
bert's (1989) model proposes that when the goal is a dispositional
one, perceivers first categorize a behavioral event or outcome (e.g.,
a successful test performance) and then characterize the target in
dispositional terms (e.g., an intelligent person). Trope's (1986)
model is similar in that it proposes that perceivers first identify or
categorize a behavioral event in terms of attributionally relevant
categories (e.g., the target performed intelligently). However, it
also suggests, unlike Gilbert's model, that situational or other
contextual factors may bias the product of this early stage of
processing. Despite this difference, both models assume that initial
categorizations and dispositional inferences require relatively few
cognitive resources and are followed by a more resource-
demanding attributional evaluation or correction stage wherein
situational and other contextual information may be considered as
alternative causes of the behavior.
A considerable body of research has supported these more
recent process models of dispositional inferences. Several studies
(Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Reich & Weary, 1998; Trope &
Alfieri, 1997; Yost & Weary, 1996) have found that the earlier,
more automatic stages of processing are relatively immune but the
final correction or evaluation stage is susceptible to disruption by
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distraction or other manipulations designed to deplete attentional
resources (Gilbert et al., 1988; Reeder, 1997). The earlier stages
have been found, however, to be susceptible to influence by salient
situational information (Trope & Gaunt, 1999) and by other con-
textually activated or chronically accessible knowledge structures
(e.g., Reich & Weary, 1998; Weary & Reich, in press). That is,
such contextual information has been shown to bias behavior
categorizations and initial dispositional inferences without per-
ceivers devoting much attention to or even being aware of the
process.
But what, exactly, is the direction of this influence of stored and
activated contextual information on the early stages of the dispo-
sitional inference process? Almost without exception, attribution
theorists and researchers have focused on the assimilative effects
of contextual information on behavior categorization and charac-
terization processes (Gilbert et al., 1988; Krull & Erickson, 1995;
Reich & Weary, 1998; Trope, 1986; Trope & Alfieri, 1997; cf.
Weary & Reich, in press). Might there be conditions under which
another's initial behavior categorizations and dispositional charac-
terizations are automatically contrasted from (i.e., inconsistent
with) the implications of contextual information? If so, what might
be the implications of such contrastive target judgments for the
inference process? Might perceivers correct for contrastive biases?
Do such corrections require cognitive resources?
These and related questions constitute the major foci of the
current research. They suggest additional complexities to the dis-
positional inference process, complexities not addressed by the
current models. To answer them, however, requires a brief con-
sideration of research that has examined the processes underlying
general judgmental assimilation and contrast effects.
Assimilation Versus Contrast of Social Judgments
Although generally neglected by attribution researchers, cer-
tainly the topic of when and how contextual information results in
assimilative or contrastive effects on various social judgments has
a long history in psychology in general and in social psychology in
particular (for reviews, see Eiser, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1992).
Although numerous models have been offered to explain the
processes underlying such effects (Helson, 1964; Manis & Paske-
witz, 1984; Ostrom & Upshaw, 1968; Sherif & Hovland, 1961),
the more recent and integrative social-cognitive models (e.g.,
Herr, 1986; Schwarz & Bless, 1992) have focused on categoriza-
tion processes as critical determinants of the direction of influence
of contextual information.
According to these models, assimilation is the default direction
of influence and results when target and context are assigned to the
same category; contrast emerges when, as a result of various
characteristics of the contextual information, target and context are
assigned to different categories. When, for example, accessible and
applicable contextual information is subliminally primed or is
otherwise made indistinct from the target information, inclusive
categorization and, hence, assimilation are more likely to occur
(Martin & Seta, 1983; Stapel & Spears, 1996; Stapel & Winkiel-
man, 1998). When the contextual information is made distinct
from the target information, when it clearly constitutes a separate
entity with object boundaries, then it likely will be excluded (i.e.,
subtracted) from the target representation. This excluded informa-
tion, if applicable to the focal judgments, then may serve as an
anchor or standard of comparison in evaluations of ambiguous or
vague target information (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). The result is
likely to be a contrast of target judgments from contextual
information.
It is important to note that in the social-cognitive literature, the
process of exclusion of contextual information from target repre-
sentations generally has been thought to require more steps and
more cognitive effort than does the default assimilative process.
However, some investigators recently have questioned whether
this really is the case for comparison-based contrast. That is, some
have suggested that when contextual information is excluded from
target representations, comparison contrast, not assimilation, might
be the default direction of contextual effects and that it might
require relatively few cognitive resources (Stapel, Koomen, & van
der Pligt, 1996; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998; Wegener & Petty,
1997). In fact, it has been argued that even some instances of
apparent judgmental assimilation actually reflect initial contrastive
influences of the context for which perceivers intentionally have
(over)corrected their focal judgments (Newman & Uleman, 1990;
Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
In the current research, we seek to examine whether
comparison-based contrast processes might, under some condi-
tions, result in automatic contrastive behavior categorizations and
corresponding characterizations of another's dispositions. We also
seek to examine whether correction for such contrastive influences
might occur when perceivers have the requisite cognitive re-
sources. Finally, an additional but secondary purpose of this re-
search is to shed light on the possible efficiency of comparison
contrast (cf. Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999). Such efficiency would,
of course, be necessary for it to influence the early, automatic
stages of the inference process.
The Current Research
One of the most frequently rendered and consequential judg-
ments people make about others concerns their levels of ability. It
is not surprising that a large literature has focused on the role of
various contextual factors in perceivers' attributions of ability (for
a review, see Weiner, 1986). We focus here on the role of their
chronic and temporary expectations for future-event outcomes in
the attribution process. Although the concept of temporary out-
come expectancies probably needs little explanation, that may not
be true of the notion of chronic future-event expectancies.
In brief, Andersen and her colleagues have suggested that peo-
ple vary in their tendencies to think about the future. Some expect
primarily positive things to happen; others, most notably moder-
ately and severely depressed individuals, expect negative things to
occur (Andersen, 1990). Moreover, those with particularly pessi-
mistic expectancies develop through experience and rehearsal a
highly efficient knowledge structure, or schema, for predicting
future events. This schema operates relatively effortlessly in that
few cognitive resources are required, and its contents are applica-
ble to the outcomes of both the self and others (Andersen, Spiel-
man, & Bargh, 1992). Andersen further argued that those who
have generally positive expectancies think less frequently about
the future; as a consequence, they develop no elaborate, efficient
schemata that enable the automatic prediction of future events.
With sufficient cognitive resources, however, they do tend to
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render more positive predictions for their own and others'
outcomes.
In a recent study, Reich and Weary (1998) provided evidence
regarding the impact of perceivers' chronically accessible, nega-
tive future-event expectancies on dispositional inferences about a
target. They found that following observation of the target's per-
formance on a test of cognitive ability, perceivers who possessed
negative future-event expectancies, as compared with those who
possessed more positive expectancies, made more negative char-
acterizations of a target's ability. Reich and Weary argued that
such assimilative effects probably were implicit and uncon-
scious—that is, that they resulted from use of the chronic expect-
ancies as interpretive frames in the early stages of the dispositional
inference process.
What might have happened, though, if participants in Reich and
Weary's (1998) studies had consciously thought about their gen-
eralized expectancies before viewing the target's taped perfor-
mance? Certainly, directing such conscious attention to base-rate
expectancies would activate and make explicit (Olson, Roese, &
Zanna, 1996) even the expectancies of individuals who possess
positive but not chronically accessible expectancies. It also might
well have instantiated them as distinct and separable from the
target information. Such distinctness of future-event expectancies
should result in their use as comparison standards and, hence, in
contrastive rather than assimilative target judgments.' Study 1
examines this possibility.
Moreover, in three additional studies, we extend the above
reasoning to an examination of the attributional effects of perceiv-
ers' distinct, temporary expectancies. In Study 2, prior to observ-
ing the target's taped task performance, participants were asked to
think about what a very successful or unsuccessful performance
might look like; activation of such performance categories should
result in the generation of distinct performance expectancies. The
last two studies use additional and different operations to manip-
ulate directly the distinctness of perceivers' negative (Study 3) or
positive and negative (Study 4) temporary expectancies for the
target's performance. In all studies, we expected that distinct,
temporary outcome expectancies would be used as comparison
standards and would, as a result, produce automatic, contrastive
effects on judgments of the target's performance and ability levels.
Temporary expectancies that were nondistinct, however, were
expected to be used as interpretation frames and to result in
automatic, assimilative influences on the dispositional inference
process. Correction for these initial contextual influences also was
examined in all four studies.
Study 1
With the exception of the procedure designed to make partici-
pants' future-event expectancies explicit and distinct from the
subsequently encountered target information, our procedures and
target materials for Study 1 were similar to those used by Reich
and Weary (1998, Study 2). Specifically, all participants were told
that their task was to observe a child's (intentionally vague)
performance on several tests of spatial ability and to judge the
child's general level of intelligence. They then were asked to select
one of four tapes to watch and were given information designed to
focus attention on their expectancies about the child's perfor-
mance. Additionally, half of the participants were asked to keep an
eight-digit number in mind while they watched the tape and
completed measures designed to assess their perceptions of the
child's level of performance, his general level of intelligence, and
the difficulty of the task. The other half of the participants received
no such instructions about a concurrent memory load task; they
simply watched the tape and completed the dependent measures.
Studies of contrastive social judgments have manipulated the
distinctness of contextual information by having participants rate
the information before rating the target (Stapel & Spears, 1996;
Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). In Study 1, we certainly could have
directed participants' conscious attention to their base-rate expect-
ancies by having them complete, prior to observation of a specific
target's performance, an assessment of either their target-based or
their generalized expectancies. This should have permitted even
individuals with primarily positive future-event expectancies (i.e.,
those not thought to possess efficient schemata that enable the
automatic prediction of future events) to generate generalized,
distinct expectancies. However, we suspected that it also would
have introduced unwanted consistency motivation or experimental
demand. Therefore, we sought a less demanding method of direct-
ing participants' conscious attention to their outcome expectancies.
In this study, immediately after participants had selected a tape
to watch, we gave them information about the taped performance.
This information was designed to focus their attention on their
performance expectancies without revealing any actual trait- or
performance-relevant information about the target. Specifically,
we informed them that although there were time requirements
associated with the test items that they were about to observe on
the tape, information about whether this particular child met those
requirements was not available. This information should serve to
activate and focus the conscious attention of all participants on
their expectancies for the videotaped performance. Because they
had no information about the specific target or task on which to
base such expectancies, all participants, even positive-expectancy
participants, had to rely on their generalized expectations. Such a
procedure should provide a distinct frame of reference for the
participants' subsequent interpretations of the target.
Accordingly, we predicted that when under cognitive load,
participants who possessed negative future-event expectancies
would automatically (i.e., efficiently and uncontrollably) judge the
behavior as more successful and the target as more intelligent, as
compared with participants who possessed positive future-event
expectancies. We further expected that all participants would en-
gage in effortful correction processes when they had the requisite
1
 In a recent study, Stapel and Schwarz (1998) found that expectancies
were more likely to serve as interpretive frames for ambiguous target
information but were more likely to serve as selective filtering devices and
comparison standards for mixed behaviors. The relevance of these findings
to the current research is not at all clear. It is difficult to fit our videotaped
stimulus materials into either an ambiguous or a mixed behavior category.
Such distinctions are much easier to make with respect to prestructured,
linguistic material of the sort used by Stapel and Schwarz. However, the
most apt description of our tape is vague. Because Stapel and Schwarz
argued that the effects of expectancies should be the same for both
ambiguous and vague information, their analysis suggests that we should
find assimilative effects of expectancies under all conditions, unless per-
ceivers are aware of the biasing influence of their expectancies and have
the requisite motivation and ability to correct for such influences.
368 WEARY, TOBIN, AND REICH
cognitive resources. Although attribution researchers generally
have argued, or at least implied, that recategorization of behavior
often does not take place (Gilbert, 1989; Trope, 1986; Trope &
Alfieri, 1997), several studies have shown that participants can
recategorize their initial impressions of target behavior if the
original behavioral information can be recalled and if there are
sufficient cognitive and motivational resources (Thompson, Ro-
man, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994). It seemed likely that
our no-load participants would be aware of the potential influence
of their conscious expectancies on their target judgments. Thus, we
predicted that no-load participants would correct their categoriza-
tions of the target's performance for this influence. We expected
these recategorizations, in turn, to mediate the effects of no-load
participants' chronic expectancies on their final dispositional
inferences.
Because all participants were given a dispositional inference
goal, we also expected that their conscious, distinct expectancies
would be most directly relevant to and only used as comparison
standards for their behavior categorizations and dispositional in-
ferences. Consequently, we did not expect participants' task dif-
ficulty inferences under cognitive load to be contrasted from their
chronic expectancies. Indeed, because these were unintended by-
products of the intentional pursuit of a dispositional, observational
goal, it was unclear what processes would affect them (Reich &
Weary, 1998). What was clear, however, was that participants, at
least under no-load conditions, should augment their dispositional
inferences to the degree that they perceive the task as difficult.
Method
Participants
Participants were 87 male and female university students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes. They received partial course credit for
their participation. Experimental sessions consisted of groups of 2-6
participants; each group was randomly assigned to either the cognitive load
or the no-load condition (ns per condition = 19-21).
Materials
The stimulus information used in this experiment was conveyed through
a 5-min videotape of an 11-year-old boy performing four test items (as
used in Reich & Weary, 1998). It showed four 30- to 78-s clips of the boy
performing four moderately difficult spatial ability tasks taken from the
block design subset of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Thorndike,
Hagen, & Sattler, 1985). Because the view of the child's work occasionally
was obstructed either by the answer key or by the examiner's head and
because the audio portion was omitted from the tape, it was somewhat
difficult to tell how well the child was doing and whether the task had been
completed successfully.2
Procedure
The experimenter greeted the participants and explained that they would
be asked to watch a video of a child performing a spatial ability task, to
complete a questionnaire about their impressions of the performance, and
also to fill out several scales for the psychology department. Participants
then read specific instructions about the experimental task. They were
informed that they would watch one of four 5-min videotapes of a child
performing different spatial ability tasks. They were told that the children
varied in their levels of intelligence and that the tasks, which measured an
important component of intelligence, varied in their levels of difficulty.
The instructions further stated that although some children performed their
tasks quite successfully, others were less successful. The instructions
included a reminder that very intelligent people sometimes appear less
intelligent because they are performing a difficult task and less intelligent
people sometimes appear very intelligent because they are performing a
simple task. The participants' task was to figure out how generally intel-
ligent the child was.
Four videotapes with different labels were positioned above the televi-
sion screen. The four tapes actually were identical. The instructions indi-
cating that the tapes depicted different children and different tasks were
intended to lead participants to think that the performance they were to
watch was randomly rather than specifically selected for particular perfor-
mance characteristics.
Expectancy focus paragraph. Next, 1 participant in each group drew a
slip of paper from a box to determine which of the four videotapes the
group would watch. The experimenter announced the chosen video (i.e.,
"Child 1, Task S") and removed some index cards from the jacket of the
chosen videotape. The experimenter distributed a card to each participant
and announced that it contained additional information about this particular
video. Participants were told to read the card carefully and then give it back
to the experimenter.3 The card read as follows:
Child 1, Task S
All of the individual test items you will see on this video were
timed. In order to move on to the next set of test items, the child
needed to complete all items in the current set within a certain time
frame. This child managed to complete the set of test items you will
be viewing. However, information on whether or not he met the time
requirements is not available.
After participants read the paragraph, the experimenter briefly reminded
participants that their goal was to figure out the child's intelligence level
and, for the cognitive-load participants only, also to remember the number
that would appear on the screen.
Cognitive load. To manipulate the attentional resources available for
making behavior categorization and attributional inferences, we instructed
half of the participants to engage in a second task while viewing the
videotape. For these participants, an eight-digit number was presented for
20 s at the beginning of the videotape. The participants were asked to
cognitively rehearse the number as they watched the tape.
Dependent measures. After viewing the tape, all participants com-
pleted a questionnaire packet. Two questions assessed dispositional judg-
ments; participants rated on 9-point scales the intelligence of the child in
the videotape (1 = very low, 9 = very high) and how they thought the child
would perform on similar other tasks (1 = very poorly, 9 = very well).
Two questions assessed participants' categorization of performance; one
asked participants to rate how well the child performed on the spatial
ability task (1 = very poorly, 9 = very well), and the other asked them to
2
 To check on the insufficiency of the information provided by the tape
for confident behavior categorization, participants in Reich and Weary's
(1998) studies were asked to indicate on a 9-point rating scale the degree
to which it was difficult to tell how well the child had performed. In both
studies, all participants indicated that it was moderately difficult (Study 1:
M = 6.05, SD = 1.90; Study 2: M = 5.71, SD = 1.88).
3
 Expectancy measures are notoriously reactive measures, and for this
reason assessments of participants' prevideo expectancies were not ob-
tained in Study 1. However, pilot testing of this general, prevideo proce-
dure, including the load instructions, has shown that prior to observation of
the target's behavior, participants' expectancies are in line with their
chronic FES levels, F(l, 46) = 6.71, p <.02 (Ms = 5.33 and 6.15 for
negative and positive FES groups, respectively).
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rate the level of performance that was depicted in the tape they had
watched (1 = very unsuccessful, 9 = very successful). Participants also
rated how difficult the spatial ability task was (1 = not at all difficult, 9 =
very difficult) and how easy they thought the task would be for most
children this age (1 = not at all easy, 9 = very easy). Eight different orders
of these questions were used; however, a dispositional or a categorization
question always came first. Participants who were required to remember
the eight-digit number recorded the number after they had completed these
measures. All participants next rated the child's likability, social skills,
nervousness, attention to the task, and activity level. Following these
questions, participants answered four multiple-choice questions designed
to assess their recall of details of the video.
Scales. Lastly, all participants completed in counterbalanced order the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) and the Future-Event Ex-
pectancy Scale (FES) developed by Andersen (1990). These scales osten-
sibly were part of a separate study being conducted by the psychology
department. The FES contains 26 items that describe both positive and
negative events. Participants in the current study judged on an 11-point
scale ( - 5 = extremely unlikely, 5 = extremely likely) the likelihood of
each event happening to them at some point in their lives. After completing
these two scales, participants were fully debriefed, with one exception. In
accord with local institutional review board requirements, they were not
told that the BDI is a measure of depressive symptoms.
Results4
Descriptive Statistics for the FES
The sum of participants' likelihood ratings for the negative
events was subtracted from the sum of their likelihood ratings for
the positive events. Total scores on the FES ranged from —57 to
108, with a mean of 46.36 and a median of 45. A median split was
used to divide participants into positive and negative FES groups.
The negative FES group included the 2 participants whose scores
fell at the median.
Preliminary Analyses
The FES and BDI were assessed at the end of the experimental
session to avoid priming negative affect and depression-related
thoughts (Reich & Weary, 1998; Weary & Reich, in press). Hence,
it was necessary to show that our experimental manipulation did
not affect scores on these measures. One-way analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) revealed no effect of load on FES or BDI scores.
Additional analyses revealed that the order of the two scales at the
end of the experimental session also had no effect on either FES or
BDI scores.
Initial analyses on all attributionally relevant measures included
as covariates participants' BDI scores and the BDI X Load inter-
action. We performed these analyses to ensure that any obtained
effects of the FES were due to chronic expectancies for the future
rather than to chronic negative affect. Because they revealed no
significant effects for either of the covariate terms, we do not
present them here.
Recall
Digits. The number of digits correctly recalled and positioned
by participants in the cognitive-load condition should show a small
number of errors. That is, a small number of mistakes indicates
both that participants are engaging in the memory task and that the
task is difficult enough to represent a cognitive demand for them
(Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Participants in the cognitive-load condi-
tion showed an average recall rate of 86%. Several researchers
have suggested that participants who recall correctly only half or
fewer than half of the digits should be excluded from analyses; that
is, a large number of errors may suggest that participants were not
engaged in the cognitive-load task and, therefore, were not under
any cognitive load (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Four participants
in Study 1 recalled three or fewer of the eight digits. In accord with
the above recommendation, we excluded their data from further
analyses. For the remaining participants, there were no effects of
FES on the number of digits correctly recalled.
Surprise video recall. Because the load manipulation was in-
troduced prior to observation of the tape, we wanted to assess
whether differences in judgments between participants under cog-
nitive load and under no load might have been due to differences
in their encoding of the details of the video. Participants responded
to four multiple-choice questions about various details of the
video: how many test items the child performed, what the color of
the child's shirt was, what was in the background, and what the
color of the test administrator's hair was. A 2 (FES group: positive,
negative) X 2 (cognitive load: load, no load) ANOVA revealed no
significant main or interaction effects on the average number of
questions answered correctly (M = 3.16).
Dispositional Inferences
Because the two dispositional items were highly correlated (r =
.67, p < .01), we averaged them to create a dispositional inference
index. A 2 (FES group) X 2 (cognitive load) ANOVA conducted
on this index yielded only the predicted Cognitive Load X FES
interaction, F(l, 79) = 11.07, p < . 01. The results of a priori
comparisons5 of the means involved in this interaction effect (see
Table 1) revealed, as predicted, that the relatively automatic dis-
positional inferences made under conditions of cognitive load were
contrasted from, whereas those made under no load were assimi-
lated to, participants' chronic expectancies.6
Mediational Analyses
Behavior categorizations. Theoretically, we would expect the
effects of participants' chronic expectancies on their dispositional
inferences to be mediated by their categorizations of the child's
4
 For all studies, initial analyses on all dependent variables included the
participants' gender as a variable. Overall, very few effects associated with
gender emerged, and none were obtained on any of the primary analyses
involving the dispositional index measure. Indeed, the only effect of gender
that qualified any predicted finding was an FES X Load X Gender
interaction on the categorization index for Study 1. This interaction qual-
ified a significant FES X Load interaction and merely reflected the fact that
under load conditions, categorization judgments showed less differentia-
tion as a function of participants' chronic expectancies for female than for
male participants. Because gender effects were not predicted and because
so few gender effects were found for all studies, we report analyses that
collapsed across this variable.
5
 All a priori comparisons of means used one-tailed tests of significance.
6
 Although our use of a median split approach to categorize participants
as possessing positive or negative future-event expectancies is consis-
tent with past research (Reich & Weary, 1998; Weary & Reich, in
press; Weary, Reich, & Tobin, in press), it also may have resulted in the
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Table 1
Study 1: Mean Target and Task Ratings as a Function of
Cognitive Load and FES
Cognitive load
Dependent measure
Behavior categorization
Negative FES
Positive FES
Dispositional inferences
Negative FES
Positive FES
Task difficulty
Negative FES
Positive FES
Load
7.67a
7.13b
7.48a
6.63b
6.14,
5.58a
No load
6.76,,
7.89a
6.62b
7.36a
5.10b
6.00a
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale (lower numbers indicate less
successful performance, lower level of ability, and lower level of task
difficulty). Higher numbers indicate greater mean ratings on all indices. On
the behavior categorization index, the difference between means for the
load conditions is a trend (p < .09). For all other comparisons on each
measure, means with different subscripts differ at/? < .05. FES = Future-
Event Expectancy Scale (Anderson, 1990).
performance (Trope, 1986). Because the effects of participants'
chronic expectancies on dispositional inferences varied systemat-
ically as a function of the cognitive-load manipulation, an exam-
ination of this notion required a test of moderated mediation. We
followed the procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) for
such tests.
Because the two behavior categorization items were highly
correlated (r — .62, p < .01), we averaged them to create a
categorization index. First, we regressed dispositional inferences
on FES group, load, and the FES X Load interaction. The FES X
Load interaction significantly predicted dispositional inferences
(fi = —35,p < .01). Second, we regressed categorizations on FES
group, load, and FES X Load. The FES X Load interaction
significantly predicted the mediator, behavior categorizations (j3 =
— .33, p < .01). The nature of this interaction effect is depicted in
Table 1. Third, we regressed dispositional inferences on FES
group, load, FES X Load, and categorization index scores (see
Figure 1). Behavior categorizations were a significant predictor of
dispositional inferences (j3 = .74, p < .01), whereas the FES X
Load interaction no longer was (/3 = - .11, p > .16). We also
performed a Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to confirm that the
reduction in the path from the FES X Load interaction to dispo-
sitional inferences was significant when behavior categorizations
were included in the regression equation, (z = —2.98, p < .01).
The results of the above analyses, then, provide support for the
mediation of dispositional inferences by behavior categorizations.7
Situational inferences. The two situational questions were not
as highly correlated as the other measures were (r = -.28);
misclassification of some participants whose scores on the FES fell close
to the median. Consequently, for all analyses involving the dispositional
inference index (including the mediational analyses), we conducted regres-
sions using continuous and centered FES scores. In all instances, the
significant effects were identical to those obtained in the analyses using the
categorical independent FES variable.
Categorization
(-.35*)
-.11
Disposition
Figure 1. Categorization as a mediator of dispositional inferences in
Study 1. The number in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the
predictor on the criterion prior to inclusion of the mediator in the regression
equation. FES = Future-Event Expectancy Scale (Anderson, 1990).
* p < .05.
consequently, we conducted analyses of the effects of situational
inferences separately for each of the measures of situational infer-
ences. Because the analyses involving the task ease measure re-
vealed no significant effects, we report only the analyses for the
task difficulty item.
An initial 2 (FES) X 2 (load) ANOVA conducted on the
measure of task difficulty revealed a significant interaction effect,
F(l, 79) = 4.52, p <.O4. The means involved in this effect and the
results of pairwise comparisons are presented in Table 1.
Could these task difficulty judgments affect, beyond any influ-
ence of behavior categorizations, dispositional inferences? If so,
adding the centered task difficulty ratings to the final regression
equation for testing the mediation of behavior categorizations on
dispositional inferences should show both to be significant predic-
tors. As in the Step 3 equation reported above, the FES X Load
interaction effect no longer predicted dispositional inferences (j3 =
-.09, p > .22), whereas behavior categorizations (/3 = .69, p <
.01) and task difficulty inferences did (j3 = .15, p < .07). These
results, then, suggest that the apparent assimilation of dispositional
inferences to participants' chronic expectancies under no-load
conditions resulted, in part, from inferential corrections for situa-
tional factors. The fact that this influence of situational on dispo-
sitional judgments occurred even under load (separate regressions
verified that the relationships between task difficulty and disposi-
tional inferences were very similar for the load and no-load con-
ditions; /3s = .15 and .14, respectively) further suggests that the
use of task difficulty in drawing inferences about intelligence may
be somewhat proceduralized in college students. That is, students
may be able to incorporate situational considerations into their
dispositional inferences about another person's intelligence with
few cognitive resources.
Ancillary Measures
If the behavior categorization and dispositional inference results
reflect comparison-based processes, we should find no differences
7
 We have chosen to conduct our path analyses in accord with past
theory and research that suggests that when perceivers have a dispositional
inference goal, they make behavior categorizations first and then form and
evaluate dispositional inferences (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986; Krull &
Erickson, 1996). It is important to note, however, that the opposite direc-
tion of causality (i.e., that dispositional inferences are made first and cause
behavior categorizations) cannot be ruled out in any of the current studies.
For all four studies, the mediational analyses work as well for one as for the
other possibility.
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in participants' standard-irrelevant evaluations of the target's be-
havior and characteristics (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). To examine
the possible generalization of contrast effects on standard-
irrelevant judgments, we included several ancillary measures ex-
amining participants' general reactions to the child. We conducted
separate two-way ANOVAs on ratings of the child's likability,
sociability, nervousness, attention to the task, and activity level.
On likability ratings, a main effect of FES was obtained, F(l,
79) = 4.09, p < .05; negative, as compared with positive, FES
participants thought the child was less likable (Ms = 6.64
vs. 7.22). No significant main or interaction effects were obtained
on the other measures.
Discussion
In Study 1, we investigated the possibility that making perceiv-
ers' immediate performance expectancies, which were based on
their implicit chronic future-event expectancies, explicit and dis-
tinct would result in their subsequent use as comparison standards
in evaluating a target's outcome (Skowronski, Carlston, & Isham,
1993; Stapel & Spears, 1996; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). Such
a process should result in relatively automatic contrastive behavior
categorizations. However, awareness-based and effortful correc-
tion for the automatic contrastive behavior categorizations should
result in correction and possibly even assimilation (i.e., overcor-
rection) to explicit expectancies about the performance when per-
ceivers have the requisite cognitive resources (Wegener & Petty,
1997; see also Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
The results offer support for these arguments. Participants'
inferences about the target's level of performance were contrasted
from the implications of their explicit, chronic expectancies under
conditions of cognitive load; under no-load conditions, partici-
pants' inferences about the target's performance outcome were
assimilated to their chronic event expectancies. Moreover, these
behavior categorizations were shown to mediate the effects of
participants' chronic expectancies and cognitive load on their
dispositional inferences of the target's ability.
That participants' nonfocal (nongoal-relevant) and standard-
irrelevant inferences about the target showed no contrast from their
chronic expectancies indirectly offers additional support for the
notion that the effects found on our focal attributional inferences
under cognitive-load conditions were due to the construction of
comparison standards rather than to the simple subtraction of
general positive and negative material from representations of the
target (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). More specifically, participants'
conscious expectancies were directed by their observational goal
toward a consideration of the target's attributionally relevant be-
havior and disposition. As a result, they apparently did not think
about the target's ancillary, task-related behaviors or general char-
acteristics in terms of the expectancy-based comparison standard.
Although we did not predict it, we obtained evidence that
participants' task difficulty inferences were weakly assimilated to
the implications of their chronic expectancies (i.e., that negative
expectancy participants saw the task as an obstacle to successful
performance) but contrasted from them under no-load conditions.
Why might this have been?
In this study, we activated through our instructions a compen-
satory schema (with graded causes and effects) for the effects of
ability and task difficulty on the target's performance. It is impor-
tant to note that such a schema permits a calibration of one cause
against another (i.e., the effect—successful performance—could
have occurred either because the child was very intelligent or
because the task was very easy). One implication of use of this
kind of schema in the current context is that the most confident
inference about ability could be made if the same level of success
were achieved on a difficult task (Kelley, 1972). Our participants
apparently arrived at initial characterizations of the task that would
have permitted the most confident goal-relevant inferences to be
made. That is, negative (positive) FES participants formed an
initial hypothesis that the relatively successful (less successful)
performance they had observed occurred on a relatively difficult
(less difficult) task (Krull & Erickson, 1995; Trope, 1986). When
they had the requisite resources available, they recategorized the
observed behavior and formed a new hypothesis that, again, would
allow for the most confident goal-relevant inferences.
It is interesting to note that having formed such characteriza-
tions of the task, participants then appeared to use them to adjust
their dispositional inferences. That is, we found a tendency for
inferences of higher task difficulty to be associated with inferences
of higher target intelligence, even after the effects of behavior
categorizations were taken into account. Moreover, this associa-
tion of task difficulty and ability ratings held regardless of whether
participants had the cognitive resources thought to be necessary by
some current attribution theorists for attributional correction.
These latter results, then, suggest that the apparent assimilation of
dispositional inferences to participants' chronic expectancies re-
sulted, in part, from the proceduralized discounting (augmentation)
of ability inferences for facilitative (inhibitory) situational factors.
This result was not entirely unexpected. Our participants, after
all, were college students who undoubtedly routinely engaged in
causal analyses of their own and others' performances on cognitive
ability tests. It would not be surprising, therefore, if they had
developed well-rehearsed attributional templates or schemata in
this domain, ones that permit "proceduralized correction" of dis-
positional inferences for situational factors. Moreover, such find-
ings of proceduralized adjustment of dispositional for task diffi-
culty inferences are consistent with Trope's model of the
dispositional inference process (Trope & Gaunt, 1999). Specifi-
cally, that model suggests that although cognitive load may impair
perceivers' ability to integrate dispositional and situational infor-
mation, the perceivers still may be able to do so when the situa-
tional information is very prominent.
Study 2
On the basis of past research (Reich & Weary, 1998), we
assumed in Study 1 that participants' initial expectancies would be
consistent with their future-event expectancies and that they would
be used as comparison standards in evaluating the quality of the
target's performance. However, to test further the idea that per-
formance expectancies could serve as comparison standards and
lead to automatic contrast in target judgments, we conducted a
second study in which we directed participants' conscious atten-
tion to particular categories of performance. Such highly accessi-
ble performance categories should, in turn, create strong and
distinct expectations for the target's performance outcome that
should be available for use as reference standards.
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In Study 2, we used the same procedure as in Study 1, with one
major difference: In this study, we instructed the participants to
think about what a highly successful or unsuccessful performance
on a test of intelligence typically looks like. On the basis of
conversational norms (Grice, 1975), we anticipated that partici-
pants would interpret these instructions as relevant to the task of
judging the child's intelligence and thus would form correspond-
ing, temporary expectancies about the videotaped performance.
We expected that these temporary expectancies would serve as
comparison standards for target judgments and, consequently,
would result in automatic contrast of behavior categorizations and
characterizations; under no-load conditions, we expected effortful
correction of target judgments. We again predicted that partici-
pants' behavior categorizations would mediate the effects of tem-
porary expectancies and cognitive load on dispositional inferences.
In accord with the results of Study 1, we also expected attributional
correction of participants' dispositional inferences both under load
and under no load.
Method
Participants
Participants were 103 male and female university students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes who received partial course credit for their
participation. We ran the experiment in groups of 2-6 participants; these
groups were randomly assigned to the load conditions. Assignment to
expectancy conditions was random (res per condition = 24-26).
Procedure
The procedure, cognitive-load manipulation, instructions, and materials
were identical to Study 1, with several exceptions. First, instead of receiv-
ing the expectancy focus card, participants received instructions to take a
minute to think about what a highly unsuccessful or a highly successful
performance on an intelligence test might look like. Specifically, after the
participants read the instructions for the experimental task and chose a
videotape, the experimenter announced that there were some additional
instructions. Each participant received the following paragraph with the
word successful or unsuccessful inserted:
The audio portion of the tape you are about to observe has been
omitted. To help you to diagnose the child's ability level, it might be
helpful for you to take a minute to think about what a highly suc-
cessful (unsuccessful) performance on tests of intelligence might look
like. After 1 min, the experimenter collected the instructions, re-
minded participants of their goals (as in Study 1), and started the
videotape.8
Second, there were several changes in the main dependent measures.
One of the dispositional inference items was changed: Instead of rating
how the child would perform on similar other tasks, participants in Study 2
rated the spatial ability of the child in the video. The two categorization
items were the same, but one of the situational items was changed slightly:
Instead of rating how easy the task would be for other children this age,
participants simply rated how easy the task was. The order of the dispo-
sitional and categorization questions was counterbalanced, and the situa-
tional items always followed.
As in Study 1, participants completed the ratings of the nonfocal char-
acteristics of the child and the four multiple-choice questions about details
of the video. In Study 2, an affect scale (Cacioppo, Martzke, Petty, &
Tassinary, 1988) was included to assess current positive and negative
affect. Participants rated 8 three-word adjective clusters on 7-point scales
(1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly), indicating how they currently felt.
Results
For Studies 2-4, preliminary analyses on all attributionally
relevant measures used as covariates an overall index of negative
affect (calculated by reverse scoring the sum of the two positive
affect items and adding this sum to the sum of the six negative
affect items) and the interaction of this with cognitive load (and, in
Study 4, the other independent variables). We perfomed these
analyses to ensure that any obtained effects of the expectancy and
outcome manipulations were not due to positive or negative affect.
In Studies 2 and 3, there were no significant effects of the covariate
terms; only analyses conducted on unadjusted ratings are reported
for those studies. For Study 4, however, at least one of the
covariates proved to be significant on the focal, attributional indi-
ces; in that study, we report the results on all dependent measures
adjusted for the covariates.
Recall
Digits. The average number of digits correctly recalled and
positioned by participants was comparable to the number found for
Study 1 (M = 89%). In accord with past research (Gilbert &
Hixon, 1991) and with Study 1, we excluded the 2 participants
who recalled fewer than half of the digits. For the remaining
participants, there was no effect of the temporary expectancy
manipulation on digit recall, F(l, 46) = 1.08, p = .30.
Video. As in Study 1, a 2 (temporary expectancy stan-
dard) X 2 (cognitive load) ANOVA revealed no significant effects
on video recall. The average recall was 3.32 out of 4 items.
Dispositional Inferences
Because the two dispositional items were highly correlated (r =
.53, p < .01), we averaged them to create a dispositional index. A
two-way ANOVA conducted on this index revealed only the
predicted Cognitive Load X Temporary Expectancy interaction,
F(l, 97) = 7.34, p < .01. Examination and planned Mest com-
parisons revealed the same pattern of means as that found for
Study 1 (see Table 2); dispositional inferences made under cogni-
tive load were contrasted from, whereas those made under no load
were assimilated to, temporary expectancies.
Mediational Analyses
Categorization. Because the two behavior categorization
items were highly correlated (r = .75, p < .01), we averaged them
to create a categorization index. An initial two-way ANOVA
conducted on the behavior categorization index revealed a signif-
8
 Because of the well-known reactivity of expectancy measures, assess-
ments of participants' prevideo expectancies for the child's performance
were not obtained in Study 2. However, a pilot study that used the
experimental procedures up to the point at which participants were to be
shown the video was conducted. The analysis of the expectancy measure
revealed the predicted main effect of expectancy standard, f(86) = 1.74,
p < .04 (Ms = 5.44 and 5.87 for negative and positive expectancy
conditions, respectively).
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Table 2
Study 2: Mean Target and Task Ratings as a Function of
Cognitive Load and Temporary Expectancy
Cognitive load
Dependent measures Load No load
Behavior categorization
Unsuccessful expectancy
Successful expectancy
Dispositional inferences
Unsuccessful expectancy
Successful expectancy
7.81a<
7.25b
7.35a
6.77,
b
8.04c
6.92b
7.37a
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale (lower numbers indicate less
successful performance, lower level of ability, and lower level of task
difficulty). Higher numbers indicate greater mean ratings on all indices. On
the dispositional inference index, the difference between means for the
unsuccessful expectancy conditions is p < .06. For all other comparisons
on each of the measures, means with different subscripts differ at/> < .05.
icant interaction effect, F(l, 97) = 7.78, p < .01 (see Table 2). As
in Study 1, we conducted a series of regressions to examine the
possible mediation by behavior categorization of the Temporary
Expectancy X Load interaction on dispositional inferences. The
results of the regression analyses are presented in Figure 2. As one
can see, they provided support for our mediational arguments.
Additionally, the results of the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986)
indicated that the reduction in the path from the Temporary Ex-
pectancy X Load interaction to dispositional inferences was sig-
nificant when categorizations were included in the regression
equation (z = -2.55, p = .01).
Situational inferences. Because the two situation questions
were highly correlated (r = -.73, p < .01), the task ease item was
reverse scored and averaged with the task difficulty item to create
an index of task difficulty. An initial two-way ANOVA conducted
on the index revealed no significant main or interaction effects
(ps > .73).
Although they were not affected by the independent variables, it
still was possible that situational inferences were used in inferen-
tial correction. If this were the case, then task difficulty ratings
should significantly predict dispositional inferences in the final
equation used in testing the mediation of behavior categorizations
on dispositional inferences. To analyze this, we regressed dispo-
sitional inferences on temporary expectancy, load, the Temporary
Expectancy X Load interaction, centered categorizations, and cen-
tered task difficulty inferences. As in the mediational analysis for
the categorization index, the Temporary Expectancy X Load in-
teraction was not a significant predictor when categorizations were
included in the equation (0 = -.12, p > .16); however, categori-
zations were (/3 = .56, p < .01). Moreover, taking these other
variables into account, task difficulty still tended to predict dispo-
sitional inferences (/3 = .15, p < .07).
Ancillary Measures
As in Study 1, we examined participants' general evaluative
ratings of the child to rule out a potential alternative interpretation
of our attribution results. Separate two-way ANOVAs conducted
on ratings of the child's likability, sociability, nervousness, atten-
tion to the task, and activity level revealed no significant main or
interaction effects on any of these evaluative ratings of the child.
These results, then, additionally support the notion that our behav-
ior categorization and dispositional inference results reflected
comparison-based processes.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide additional evidence that distinct
outcome expectancies can serve as comparison standards for target
judgments. As we expected, participants' dispositional inferences
were automatically contrasted from and effortfully assimilated
(i.e., overcorrected) to manipulated temporary expectancy stan-
dards in the load and no-load conditions, respectively. Moreover,
analyses showed that for all participants, the effects of temporary
expectancies and cognitive load on their dispositional judgments
were mediated by their categorizations of the target's performance.
Specifically, when under cognitive load, participants who thought
about an unsuccessful performance prior to viewing the perfor-
mance rated it as more successful and the child as more intelligent
compared with participants who initially thought about a success-
ful performance. However, when participants were not under cog-
nitive load, those who initially thought about an unsuccessful
outcome, compared with those who thought about a successful
one, rated the target as less successful and the child as less
intelligent.
In addition to this likely awareness-based correction of dispo-
sitional inferences for explicit expectancies under no-load condi-
tions, further analyses also were suggestive of relatively effortless
attributional adjustment of dispositional inferences for situational
factors. As in Study 1, higher task difficulty ratings were associ-
ated with higher intelligence ratings, and this relationship held
regardless of participants' levels of cognitive load. Moreover,
analyses revealed that situational inferences accounted for a sig-
nificant amount of variance in dispositional inferences, even when
the effects of the Temporary Expectancy X Load interaction and
behavior categorizations were controlled. Unlike Study 1, how-
ever, the interaction of temporary expectancies and load did not
predict participants' inferences of task difficulty. It seems likely
that our instructions to think about a performance on an intelli-
gence test served to evoke a representation of a difficult test and,
thus, probably limited the variability in participants' task difficulty
inferences that was accounted for by our manipulated variables.
Still, there apparently was enough variation in participants' intu-
-.27* /
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Temporary
Expectancy x
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Categorization
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(-.27*)
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Disposition
Figure 2. Categorization as a mediator of dispositional inferences in
Study 2. The number in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the
predictor on the criterion prior to inclusion of the mediator in the regression
equation. * p < .05.
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itive notions about the difficulty of intelligence tests to find evi-
dence of attributional adjustment of dispositional inferences.
Study 3
The results for Studies 1 and 2 were consistent with the notion
that the distinctness of the perceivers' expectancies resulted in
their use as comparison standards in the relatively automatic
evaluations of the target's performance outcome and that such
performance categorizations determined, in part, perceivers' initial
dispositional inferences. A study that included a direct manipula-
tion of the distinctness of perceivers' expectancies, however,
would provide a stronger test of this notion. This was the major
purpose of Study 3.
The same general procedure as was used in Studies 1 and 2 also
was used in Study 3. In Study 3, however, only the effects of
negative outcome expectancies were examined. To vary the dis-
tinctness of participants' expectancies, we gave half of the partic-
ipants in this study the negative expectancy standard instructions
used in Study 2. Specifically, prior to their observation of the
videotape, we told them to think about what a highly unsuccessful
performance on a test of intelligence typically looks like. The other
participants were given instructions designed to suggest that the
level of the target's general performance had been unsuccessful.
This procedure has been used in two other studies (Weary, Reich,
& Tobin, in press) to create negative expectancies that are, by
definition, not separable from the actual performance information.
The theoretical rationale underlying the predictions for the current
Studies 1 and 2 suggests that such nondistinct expectancies would
be used as interpretation frames and would result in assimilation of
perceivers' relatively automatic behavior categorizations and tar-
get characterizations to them. That was, in fact, what was found in
this earlier research; participants under cognitive load who re-
ceived the negative performance level information rendered more
negative evaluations of the target's performance and intellectual
levels, compared with participants who had received positive per-
formance level information. Moreover, inferential correction for
the assimilative effects of the nondistinct expectancies was ob-
served in that earlier work. When participants had sufficient cog-
nitive resources, they questioned the diagnosticity or sufficiency of
the performance level information for their behavior categoriza-
tions and dispositional inferences.
In the current study, we expected that when under cognitive
load, participants in the distinct expectancy condition would use
their expectancies as standards of comparison and would evidence
more favorable (contrastive) behavior categorizations and target
characterizations than would participants in the nondistinct expect-
ancy condition. When participants were not under cognitive load,
we expected both distinct and nondistinct expectancy condition
participants to engage in inferential correction for the effects of
their expectancies.
Method
Participants
these groups were randomly assigned to the load conditions. Assignment to
expectancy conditions was random (ns per condition = 12-17).
Procedure
The general procedure, instructions, cognitive-load manipulation, and
materials were identical to Study 2, with the exception of the distinctness-
of-expectancy manipulation. Although half of the participants received the
same negative expectancy standard instructions used in Study 2, the other
half received instructions designed to create nondistinct expectancies.
Specifically, after reading the instructions for the experimental task and
choosing a videotape, the experimenter announced that there were some
additional instructions. Nondistinct expectancy participants received the
following paragraph.
Additional Instructions
The audio portion of the tape you are about to observe has been
omitted. All of the test items you will see on this video were timed. In
order to move on to the next set of test items, the child needed to
complete all items in the current set within a certain time frame.
Although this child managed to complete the set of test items you will
be viewing, he was not successful in meeting the time requirements.
Consequently, he was not successful enough to continue testing.
Pilot testing for an earlier study (Weary, Reich, & Tobin, in press)
demonstrated that this manipulation results in negative expectancies
(Ms = 4.81 and 5.69 on 9-point scales of performance and intellectual
expectancies, respectively, compared with 7.35 and 6.85 for a positive
expectancy condition, ps < .001) comparable to those that result from the
manipulation of distinct negative expectancies (see Footnote 8).
Immediately after viewing the tape, participants completed items de-
signed to assess their behavior categorizations and dispositional and task
difficulty inferences. These items were identical to the ones used in
Studies 1 and 2. On 9-point scales, participants rated how well the child
had done on the spatial ability task (behavior categorization measure) and
how intelligent the child was in general (dispositional inference item). The
order of these items was counterbalanced. Next, participants were asked to
rate on the 9-point scale the difficulty of the spatial ability task in the video.
Finally, they were asked for their general evaluative ratings of the child's
likability and sociability, their memory for details for the tape (to the four
multiple-choice memory items used in Studies 1 and 2 we added an item
that asked participants to indicate the color of the blocks), and their current
affect.
Results
Recall
Participants were 65 male and female university students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes. They received partial course credit for
their participation. We ran the experiments in groups of 1-4 participants;
Digits. The average number of digits correctly recalled and
positioned by participants was comparable to those found for
Studies 1 and 2 (M = 83%). We excluded the 4 participants who
recalled fewer than half of the digits. For the remaining partici-
pants, a one-way ANOVA revealed no effect of the distinctness of
expectancy manipulation on digit recall.
Video. As in Studies 1 and 2, a 2 (distinctness of expect-
ancy) X 2 (cognitive load) ANOVA revealed no significant effects
on video recall. The average recall was 3.97 of 5 items.
Dispositional Inferences
A two-way ANOVA conducted on participants' ratings of the
child's general intellectual level revealed a main effect of distinct-
ness of expectancies, F(l, 57) = 6.52, p = .01. This main effect
was qualified, however, by the predicted Distinctness of Expect-
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ancy X Cognitive Load interaction, F(l, 57) = 5.86, p < .02 (see
Table 3). Planned Z-test comparisons of means revealed that par-
ticipants who thought about an unsuccessful performance rated the
child as significantly more intelligent than did participants who
were told that the child had not been successful enough to continue
testing. There was no difference between mean ratings under
no-load conditions.
Mediational Analyses
Categorization. An initial 2 (distinctness of expectancy) X 2
(load) ANOVA conducted on the behavior categorization measure
revealed a significant interaction effect, F(l, 57) = 3.96, p = .05
(see Table 3). As in Studies 1 and 2, we conducted a series of
regressions to examine the possible mediation by behavior cate-
gorization of the Distinctness of Expectancy X Load interaction on
dispositional inferences. The results of the regression analyses are
presented in Figure 3. As one can see, they offer support for our
mediational arguments. Additionally, the results of the Sobel test
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) reveal that the reduction in the path from
the interaction term to dispositional inferences approached signif-
icance when categorizations were included in the regression equa-
tion (z = 1.78, p = .07).
Situational inferences. As in Studies 1 and 2, we conducted an
initial two-way ANOVA on participants' ratings of task difficulty.
This analysis revealed only a significant Distinctness of Expect-
ancy X Load interaction, F(l, 56) = 4.87, p = .03 (see Table 3 for
the means involved in this interaction effect). We then examined
whether situational inferences were used in inferential correction.
If this were the case, then task difficulty ratings should signifi-
cantly predict dispositional inferences in the final equation used in
testing the mediation of behavior categorizations on dispositional
inferences. Accordingly, we regressed dispositional inferences on
distinctness of expectancy, load, their interaction, centered cate-
gorizations, and centered task difficulty inferences. As in the
mediational analysis for categorization, the Distinctness of Expect-
ancy X Load interaction was not a significant predictor when
Table 3
Study 3: Mean Target and Task Ratings as a Function of
Cognitive Load and Distinctness
Cognitive load
Dependent measures
Behavior categorization
Distinct expectancy
Nondistinct expectancy
Dispositional inferences
Distinct expectancy
Nondistinct expectancy
Task difficulty
Distinct expectancy
Nondistinct expectancy
Load
7.92a
6.07b
7.42a
6.07b
6.33a
5.50a
No load
7.71a
7.00d
6.65C
6.6 lc
4.82b
6.00a
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale (lower numbers indicate less
successful performance, lower level of ability, and lower level of task
difficulty). Higher numbers indicate greater mean ratings on all measures.
On the dispositional inference measure, the difference between nondistinct
means is p < .08. For all other comparisons on each measure, means not
sharing a common subscript differ at p < .05.
Distinctiveness
of Expectancy x
Load
Figure 3. Categorization as a mediator of dispositional inferences in
Study 3. The number in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the
predictor on the criterion prior to inclusion of the mediator in the regression
equation. * p < .05.
categorizations were included in the equation ()3 = .12, p > .28);
however, behavior categorizations were (/8 = .40, p < .01).
Moreover, controlling for these other variables, task difficulty
inferences still predicted dispositional inferences (/? = .30,
p = .01).
Ancillary Measures
As in Study 1, we examined participants' general evaluative
ratings of the child to rule out a potential alternative interpretation
of our attribution results. Separate 2 (distinctness of expect-
ancy) X 2 (cognitive load) ANOVAs conducted on ratings of the
child's Iikability and sociability revealed no significant main or
interaction effects.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 provide more direct evidence that distinct
outcome expectancies can serve as comparison standards for target
judgments. Under cognitive load, the dispositional inferences of
distinct expectancy participants, as compared with nondistinct
expectancy participants, showed contrast effects; under no load,
both distinct and nondistinct expectancy participants showed evi-
dence of effortful correction of their dispositional inferences for
the effects of their expectancies and for task difficulty. Finally,
analyses showed that the effects of distinctness of expectancies
and cognitive load on participants' dispositional judgments were
mediated by their categorizations of the target's performance.
It is important to note two limitations of this study. First, there
is at least one alternative interpretation for the results that must be
considered. The manipulation of the distinctness of expectations
was confounded with the presence or absence of performance
information about the specific target. Although pilot work dem-
onstrated that perceiver expectancies for the target's performance
were comparable and negative in both distinct and nondistinct
expectancy conditions, it is conceivable that this information rather
than the distinctness of perceiver expectancies might have resulted
in the pattern of results obtained on the measures of target and task
inferences. Second, because only negative expectancies were used
in this study, it is impossible to tell whether the obtained contrast
is relative only to the apparent assimilation effects. A final study,
therefore, was conducted to address these issues.
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Study 4
We noted earlier in this article that a typical method used by
researchers (Martin & Seta, 1983; Stapel & Spears, 1996; Stapel &
Winkielman, 1998) for manipulating the distinctness of expectan-
cies involves having perceivers explicitly evaluate contextual in-
formation either before (distinct condition) or after (nondistinct
condition) evaluating the target information. In Study 4, we used
such a procedure. We implemented the same general procedure as
we used in Studies 1-3. However, prior to presentation of the
videotape, all participants were given a scoring sheet that depicted
the target's successful or unsuccessful performance on a similar
test 3 years earlier. For half of the participants, this scoring sheet
was followed by a request to make explicit ratings of the child's
performance and intellectual level on the basis of the scoring
report. Such explicit ratings should render the representation of the
earlier performance and expectancies based on it distinct and
separable from the videotaped performance. The remaining par-
ticipants were not asked to make ratings of the prior performance
until after they had evaluated the target as depicted on the video-
tape. For these participants, the contextual information should
remain abstract and indistinct from the target information. For the
former group of participants, then, the prior performance should be
used as a comparison standard and result in contrastive target
judgments; for the latter group, it should be used as an interpre-
tation frame and result in assimilation.
Method
Participants
Participants were 136 male and female university students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes. They received partial course credit for
their participation. Participants went through the experimental procedure
individually and were assigned randomly to conditions (ns = 14-18).
Procedure
The procedure, cognitive-load manipulation, instructions, materials, and
measures were identical to those used in Study 2, with the exception of two
changes associated with the manipulation of participant expectancies. First,
after receiving instructions that they would be asked to chose one of our
tapes to watch, the participants were told that all of the children were being
tracked over a number of years to see whether their scores change. Second,
after they selected a tape to watch, participants were given a scoring sheet
for the target's performance on similar test items 3 years earlier. This
scoring sheet indicated that the target had missed 2 (successful context
condition) or 9 (unsuccessful context condition) of 10 items.9 Half of the
participants (distinct expectancy condition) then were asked to rate on
9-point scales the child's general intellectual level and how well the child
had performed on that earlier occasion. The order of these two questions
was counterbalanced. The other participants were not asked to make any
ratings of the child's earlier performance at that time (nondistinct expect-
ancy condition). Following this manipulation of the distinctness of expect-
ancies, the procedure followed that used in the previous studies. Partici-
pants were reminded of their goal and, in the load conditions, to remember
the eight-digit number. They then watched the videotaped performance.
Following the tape, all participants completed the attribution-relevant,
digit recall, and ancillary measures of target likability and sociability (the
order of the dispositional and categorization questions was counterbal-
anced, and these items were always followed by the situational items).
Next, they completed several measures designed to check on their percep-
tions that the scoring card had influenced their perceptions of the child's
performance and the direction of this influence. Finally, they completed the
video recall measure from Study 3 and the affect measures.
Results
Previous research (Manis & Paskewitz, 1984) has indicated that
conditions typically conducive to direct contrastive effects on
target judgments also may result in concurrent weaker, indirect
assimilative effects associated with perceivers' evaluations of the
contextual information. In Studies 1-3, to rule out potential alter-
native interpretations of our obtained findings, we chose not to ask
participants to indicate their expectancies or to evaluate the con-
text. However, in Study 4, the timing of just such a context
evaluation constituted the manipulation of distinctness of expect-
ancies. Consequently, we were able to examine judgmental con-
trast parsed of any indirect, assimilative effects of context evalu-
ations. This was accomplished by averaging the two highly related
(r = .84, p < .001) evaluations of the target's prior performance
and intellectual level and using this context-evaluation index, in
interaction with the load, the Load X Distinctiveness of Expect-
ancy, and the Load X Distinctness X Context Valence terms as
covariates in all analyses.
Recall
Digits. The average number of digits correctly recalled and
positioned was comparable to those found for Studies 1-3 (M =
89%). We excluded the 6 participants who recalled fewer than half
of the digits. For the remaining participants, a 2 (context va-
lence) X 2 (distinctness of expectancy) ANCOVA revealed no
significant effects for the number of digits correctly recalled.
Video. A 2 (context valence) X 2 (distinctness of expect-
ancy) X 2 (cognitive load) ANCOVA revealed no significant
effects on video recall. The average recall was 4.15 of 5 items.
Dispositional Inferences
Because the two dispositional items were highly correlated (r =
.78, p < .001), we averaged them to form a dispositional index. A
three-way ANCOVA conducted on this index revealed only the
predicted three-way interaction, F(l, 115) = 4.52, p < .04.
Planned Mest comparisons of means revealed that under cognitive-
load conditions, distinct expectancy participants exposed to the
target's unsuccessful prior performance rated him as more intelli-
gent than did those who were exposed to his successful prior
performance. Moreover, in nondistinct expectancy conditions,
those exposed to the target's successful prior performance rated
him as more intelligent compared with those in the distinct
expectancy-success condition. Under no-load conditions, both dis-
tinct and nondistinct expectancy participants corrected their infer-
ences. Participants with distinct expectancies made lower ratings
of the target's intelligence when exposed to his prior unsuccessful
9
 The results of a pilot study indicate that participants' expectancies with
respect to the child's videotaped performance outcome and likely intellec-
tual level were consistent with the valence of the context manipulation,
F(l, 51) = 57.16 and 35.59, respectively, ps < .001, and did not vary by
cognitive load.
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performance, as compared with his successful performance. The
dispositional inferences of nondistinct expectancy participants did
not differ as a function of context valence. (See Table 4 for results
of all pairwise comparisons.)
Mediational Analyses
Categorization. Because the two behavior categorization
items were highly correlated (r = .78, p < .001), we averaged
them to create a categorization index. An initial three-way analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) conducted on this index revealed a
marginally significant main effect indicative of assimilation to
context valence, F(l, 115) = 3.71, p = .06. It also yielded a
Context Valence X Load interaction, F(\, 115) = 5.61, p = .02,
which was qualified by the predicted three-way Context Va-
lence X Distinctness of Expectancy X Load interaction, F(l,
115) = 5.79, p < .02 (see Table 4). We again conducted a series
of regressions to examine the possible mediation by behavior
categorizations of the Context Valence X Distinctness of Expect-
ancy X Load interaction on dispositional inferences. The results of
the regression analyses are presented in Figure 4. As one can see,
they offer support for our mediational arguments. Additionally, the
results of the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) revealed that the
reduction in the path from the interaction to dispositional infer-
ences was significant when categorizations were included in the
regression equation (z = —2.35, p < .02).
Situational inferences. Because the two situation questions
were moderately correlated (r = —.47, p < .001), the task ease
item was reverse scored and averaged with the task difficulty item
to create an index of task difficulty. As in the previous studies, we
conducted an initial three-way ANOVA on this index. It revealed
a main effect of distinctness of expectancy, F(\, 115) = 4.49, p <
.04, that was qualified by a significant Distinctness X Load inter-
action, F( 1, 115) = 4.53, p < .04, such that the task was perceived
as least difficult by nondistinct expectancy participants
(M = 4.45), particularly those under cognitive load (M = 5.91; Ms
Table 4
Study 4: Adjusted Mean Target and Task Ratings as a Function
of Cognitive Load and Distinctness
-.40
Distinctness x
Context Valence x
Load
Categorization
(-.37*)
-.08
Disposition
Figure 4. Categorization as a mediator of dispositional inferences in
Study 4. The number in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the
predictor on the criterion prior to inclusion of the mediator in the regression
equation. * p < .05.
for no-load distinct and nondistinct expectancy conditions
were 5.42 and 5.80, respectively).
We then examined whether situational inferences were used in
inferential correction. If this were the case, then task difficulty
ratings should significantly predict dispositional inferences in the
final equation used in testing the mediation of behavior categori-
zations on dispositional inferences. To analyze this, we regressed
dispositional inferences on context valence, distinctness of expect-
ancy, load, the two- and three-way interactions of these manipu-
lated variables, centered categorizations, and centered task diffi-
culty inferences. As in the mediational analysis for categorization,
the three-way interaction was not a significant predictor when
categorizations were included in the equation (/3 = — .06, p > .62);
however, behavior categorizations were a significant predictor
(j3 = .72, p < .001). Moreover, controlling for these other vari-
ables, there was a tendency for task difficulty to predict disposi-
tional inferences ()3 = .12, p = .07).
Ancillary Measures
As in Study 1, we examined participants' general evaluative
ratings of the child to rule out a potential alternative interpretation
of our attribution results. Separate three-way ANCOVAs revealed
no significant main or interaction effects on ratings of the child's
likability and sociability.
Cognitive load No cognitive load Awareness of Bias
Dependent measure
Behavior categorization
Distinct expectancy
Nondistinct expectancy
Dispositional inferences
Distinct expectancy
Nondistinct expectancy
Failure
7.79a
7.35cd
7.28a
6.86ac
Success
6.06b
7.97a
6.10,,
7.27a
Failure
5.84b
6.83d
6.08b
6.68C
Success
8.00a
7.42C
7.65a
6.79,.
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale (lower numbers indicate less
successful performance, lower level of ability, and lower level of task
difficulty). Higher numbers indicate greater mean ratings on all measures.
On the categorization index, the nondistinct-success means differed at p <
.06; within load conditions and the means for the distinct-nondistinct
failure expectancy conditions differed at p < .07; within no-load condi-
tions, the distinct-nondistinct success and the nondistinct success—failure
comparisons differed at p < .08. On the dispositional index measure, the
no-load-failure means differed at p < .06. For all other comparisons on
each measure, means not sharing a common subscript differ at p < .05.
To ascertain whether participants were aware of the effects of
any biases introduced by and inferential corrections in response to
the contextual information, we asked them two additional ques-
tions. First, we asked whether the scoring sheet they had read
before observation of the videotaped performance had made their
initial impressions of the child more positive or more negative than
they otherwise would have been (—4 = more negative; 4 = more
positive). Next, we asked them whether, while watching the vid-
eotape, their impressions of the child's intelligence had become
more positive or more negative (—4 = more negative; 4 = more
positive). After adding a value of 5 to participants' ratings on these
measures to avoid the use of zeroes, we correlated the ratings with
each other. A positive correlation indicated that participants be-
lieved their final, target impressions were consistent with their
perceptions of the influence of the initial contextual bias, whereas
a negative correlation reflected a divergence of initial and final
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impressions. Such a divergence would be expected if participants
had attempted to correct their final impressions for the perceived
contextual bias. As expected, the relationship between initial and
final impressions was significant and positive in the load condi-
tions (r = .31, p < .02); in the no-load conditions, it was signif-
icant and negative (r = —.34, p < .01).
Finally, we correlated participants' perceptions of the change in
their impressions of the target's ability with their categorizations
of the child's performance and their dispositional inferences. As
expected, these correlations were positive in both load (for cate-
gorizations and dispositional inferences, r = .25, p < .05, and r =
.23, p < .07, respectively) and no-load conditions (for categoriza-
tions and dispositional inferences, r = .25, p < .05, and r = .34,
p < .005, respectively). Together, then, these results suggest that
participants were aware of the impact of the contextual bias on
their judgments of the target's performance level and the direction
of their inferential corrections.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 were consistent with those of Studies 1-3,
even though the distinct contextual information concerned the
target's own prior performance on a test of cognitive ability. As
expected, when participants' cognitive resources were depleted,
their behavior categorizations were automatically contrasted from
the target's distinct but not nondistinct prior performance. Under
no-load conditions, participants' behavior categorizations were
corrected for the effects of distinct contextual information. Study 4
additionally provided evidence that participants' behavior catego-
rizations mediated the effects of the independent variables on
dispositional inferences and, furthermore, that correction of dispo-
sitional inferences for task difficulty occurred under load and
no-load conditions. Finally, consistent with our arguments on the
awareness-based nature of the corrections for contextual expect-
ancies, Study 4 provided evidence suggesting that participants
were aware of the contextually produced biases and of their
inferential corrections.
General Discussion
In four studies, we examined whether making outcome expect-
ancies distinct would result in their use as comparison standards or
anchors and, consequently, in contrastive categorizations of a
target's behaviors. The expectancies examined were based either
on usually implicit, chronic future-event expectancies (Study 1) or
on temporary, manipulated expectancy standards (Studies 2—4). In
each study, by directing participants' conscious attention toward
consideration of their generalized or temporary expectancies prior
to observation of the target's videotaped performance, we were
able to make the expectancies clearly separable from the target
information. Such distinctness of expectancies, like distinctness of
other types of contextual information (Stapel & Spears, 1996;
Stapel & Winkielman, 1998), was expected to result in contrast of
relevant social judgments.
Overall, the results of the current research provide evidence of
such contrastive categorizations. It is important to note that they
also shed light on the suggestion made by investigators in related
areas of research that comparison contrast may occur relatively
efficiently. In all four studies, some participants were asked to
perform a concurrent, secondary task. Under such conditions, these
participants were arguably less able to engage in effortful process-
ing, and they made categorizations of the target's performance that
were contrasted from the implications of their distinct expectan-
cies. More specifically, under conditions of cognitive load, partic-
ipants with negative (and distinct) expectancies, as compared with
those with positive (or nondistinct) expectancies, evaluated the
target's performance as more successful.
Furthermore, all four studies found evidence consistent with
controlled, subtraction-based correction of categorizations for the
likely (contrastive) biasing influence of expectancies when partic-
ipants' cognitive resources were not depleted by concurrent task
demands. More specifically, when cognitive resources were avail-
able, participants' effortful correction of their judgments resulted
in assimilation to the evaluative implications of their distinct
expectancies. Study 4 provided direct evidence of participants'
awareness of the contextual bias and, by implication, of the
awareness-based nature of the correction process.
The Dispositional Inference Process
Recent models (Gilbert, 1989; Trope, 1986) of the dispositional
inference process have proposed that perceivers' initial, relatively
automatic characterizations of another's dispositions ought to cor-
respond with and, in fact, be mediated by their categorizations of
the other's behavior. Because these models argue that recategori-
zation of behavior generally does not occur, such correspondence
is not necessarily expected when perceivers have the cognitive
resources thought to be necessary for inferential correction. That
is, if perceivers are able and motivated to take relevant contextual
information into account, then the correspondence of their behav-
ior categorizations and final dispositional inferences may well be
attenuated or no longer evident. Indeed, past research has found
perceivers' behavior categorizations to mediate their relatively
automatic dispositional characterizations; however, when perceiv-
ers have the cognitive resources required for attributional correc-
tion of their characterizations, no such mediational relationship has
been observed (e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Trope & Alfieri,
1997).
In all four of the current studies, we found evidence consistent
with the idea that the effects of contextual information on partic-
ipants' dispositional inferences were mediated by their behavior
categorizations, regardless of the level of cognitive load. At least
part of the reason that this mediational relationship was found for
both load and no-load condition participants was that participants
appeared to engage in recategorization of the observed target
behavior when they had the requisite resources.
Why did we find evidence of such recategorization under no-
load conditions when several previous studies have not? We think
it possible that the procedures used in these earlier studies may
well have rendered categorizations rather inflexible to correction
processes. That is, participants in those studies were provided with
specific, unambiguous situational information that could be used to
disambiguate target behaviors. Because the current studies pro-
vided participants with no such information, it seems reasonable to
argue that the categorizations of participants in our research could
remain more flexible. It also is important to note that our findings
support other studies showing that perceivers can recategorize
their initial impressions of target behavior if the original target
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information can be recalled and if there are sufficient cognitive and
motivational resources (Thompson et al., 1994). At any rate, we,
like other authors (Reeder, 1997), believe that future researchers
will need to consider more fully than has heretofore been the case
the conditions under which observed behaviors (and, as in Stud-
ies 1, 3, and 4, even situational categorizations) may be recatego-
rized at the correction stage and the likely complex implications of
such recategorizations for the dispositional inference process.
Process of Contrast
We have argued that because contrast to expectancies occurred
only on the focal, attributionally relevant dimensions in all four
studies (i.e., categorization of performance, intelligence of child),
the contrast was due to the construction of a comparison standard
and not to a subtraction of generally valenced material from the
representation of the child (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). That is, we
would have expected to find contrast on participants' ratings of
general, evaluative characteristics of the target categorizations if
the latter process had been responsible for the contrast effects we
observed.
We also have argued that this comparison-based contrast oc-
curred automatically (i.e., was efficient). The major reason for this
interpetation of our findings is that the judgmental contrast effect
occurred only under conditions where participants' cognitive re-
sources were likely to have been depleted and, therefore, where
effortful processing was less likely. Is it possible instead, though,
that participants could have engaged in some kind of correction
procedure prior to observation of the tape? That is, at the time
participants were focusing on their expectancies for the upcoming
performance, could those participants who had received instruc-
tions about the upcoming digit-memory task have been trying to
disregard or correct in advance for the possible influence of their
expectancies (cf. Stapel, Martin, & Schwarz, 1998; Wegener &
Petty, 1995; Wilson & Brekke, 1994)? If this had been the case,
then load participants might have tried to correct for the likely
assimilative influence of their contextually based expectancies
prior to watching the videotaped performance by resetting them.
We believe that this possibility is not particularly likely.
Cognitive-load instructions are standard practice in this type of
research (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope &
Alfieri, 1997), and there currently are no data to indicate that
participants are aware that having to remember a sequence of
digits impairs their ability to make accurate inferences. Indeed, a
number of past studies using similar load instructions have found
assimilation to, not contrast from, various activated constructs on
participants' social judgments when they have been made under
conditions of cognitive load.
Implications and Conclusions
The current research adds to an evolving view of both the person
perception process and the research on judgmental assimilation
and contrast effects. Our findings suggest that some parts of the
dispositional inference process are more flexible than perhaps they
originally were thought to be. In both studies, we found evidence
of behavior recategorization under no cognitive load and proce-
duralized consideration of situational factors under cognitive load
conditions. We also obtained some evidence suggestive of recat-
egorization of situational cues. Future research should explore the
limits of recategorization and proceduralized correction processes.
Is recategorization something that can only occur when the initial
disambiguation and categorization of target information is diffi-
cult? Is consideration of situational inferences under cognitive load
something that occurs only on tasks with which participants are
intimately familiar? Answers to such questions likely will reveal
an even more complex but more complete picture of the disposi-
tional inference process.
In addition, this research provides evidence that certain types of
contrast can occur with little expenditure of cognitive resources, an
idea that slowly has been gathering theoretical momentum. Al-
though the findings of the current research are consistent with the
notion that this relatively automatic judgmental contrast effect
resulted from comparison-based processes, future research should
attempt to delineate further the process by which distinct expect-
ancies have their effects. Specifically, future research should in-
vestigate whether the effects occur during the encoding of the
performance (an on-line contrast effect) or at the judgment stage as
a result of retrieval of contextual and target information. More-
over, it would be interesting to explore whether correction for
contrastive influences is a process that can occur after a delay;
such delayed correction has been shown to be possible in the case
of attributional correction for assimilative influences (Gilbert &
Osborne, 1989). Finally, the possibility that some outcomes or
types of target judgments might be more or less amenable to
contrast effects of the sort we have uncovered here warrants
further conceptual and empirical work.
In conclusion, the findings of the current studies have implica-
tions for the judgments we make in everyday life. We often are
under less than ideal conditions of cognitive resource deployment
and, hence, are susceptible to many influences from our environ-
ment (including our cognitive environment). It is useful to know
that under certain conditions, even the positive expectancies that
we might have about an upcoming event can result in more
negative evaluations of others than if we had held more negative
expectancies. People, apparently, are quite aware of such biases
and show the ability to correct for them when they are motivated
and have the cognitive resources necessary to do so. However, as
is often the case, attempts at correction may sometimes result in a
bias in the other direction (i.e., overcorrection).
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